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Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000100110016-0

14 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with HSC Staff Leaders

25X1 [redacted] Searle Field, Aaron Donner and I met for three and one-half hours, 13 August 1975. Here are some of the major points:

1. Committee defensiveness: Late in the conversation, Field expressed the view that the HSC mandate was not politically popular. He said that when he went to his home town 18 out of 20 people who approached him would say, "hope you are not destroying that outfit," or, "I sure hope that you know what you are doing." Only two people would slap him on the back and say, "right on."

Donner also quite strongly indicated that he felt a public relations campaign was being conducted to undercut the Committee's activity by demonstrating that the Agency was being hurt.

Field also said that he had a nightmare that shortly after the Committee report was in, a Seymour Hersh article would appear revealing a huge area of abuse that the HSC had not uncovered. Thus they felt the need to investigate broadly enough to uncover all potential land mines.

2. HSC interests. They would want to look at collection systems which spread across the community, for example, overhead reconnaissance, to spot areas of inefficiency, duplication, or over-sophistication.


They were interested in detailees from the Agency to other offices being convinced that here was at least a potential area for abuse.

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They were interested in proprietaries and had allegations that some were used illegally for personal gain. This could involve an employee resigning to take over a lucrative proprietary after setting it up, or one getting such a fat expense account that he was able substantially to increase his income, or one receiving gifts from a proprietary.



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They were concerned about duplication in the counter-intelligence field, primarily among the military but also in CIA. They were convinced that here they had a winner.

They asked for any thoughts we might have on legislation which should emerge from this investigation. What they clearly wanted were ideas on how any permanent oversight committee could assure itself of continuing effective control over the community.

They were concerned about the disproportion between collection and analysis.

They were impressed with CIA employees, and wondered if they could discover how this quality was achieved, so the word could be spread to other agencies.

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3. Procedures. I believe we resolved the compartmentization and compartmented clearances difficulty. We agreed that compartmented clearances need not be a problem. When an investigator pursuing an assigned line of inquiry ran into problems because of compartments, he would advise Review Staff and we would see that he was cleared promptly. (It is important that this be done with alacrity and finesse. Will have to clear this with IC to ensure that the same policy is followed by other organizations, i. e., that they alert us promptly to any clearance problems so that we can see that the staffer receives those clearances that we control.)

Donner and Field said that ordinarily they would not be interested in the specific inner workings of any of the various sophisticated compartmented devices. This would only come about if they were studying duplicative or cost-ineffective systems.

They agreed that ordinarily they would not be interested in specific names. In any case, we could sanitize them as usual. As soon as an investigator indicated that he was having a problem with sanitization, we would discuss it with him in an effort to resolve the problem on the spot, perhaps by giving a generalized description of the individual or by substituting a different name which they could use or contact without difficulty for us. If we could not resolve it, we would refer disputes further up, and promptly. However, Field urged that all disputes be resolved at the lowest level possible to avoid confrontations and raising problems.

Field agreed that he would try to focus his requests so that they were more specific than they had been.

4. Misconceptions. Two questions revealed a curious idea as to how the Agency would be responding to the investigation. Field asked how he could determine when interviewees would be lying to him. Donner asked how they would recognize false documents that we might provide to them.


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5. Miscellaneous. Field said that they were now assigning teams. He said that we should hold off on Pike's request for a sample of what the President sees. Field emphasized his desire to uphold security and said that he is regularly impressing this on the staff. He felt that no leaks would develop from staff members. He was not so certain about Committee members, pointing to their great desire to put things into the public record. Field urged that we take every opportunity to remind the investigators of the need for security without being patronizing or condescending,



Assistant to the Director

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COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Rev If I missed any points, let me know.			
Hate to harp, but neither [redacted] nor I know how to respond to a request for [redacted] compartmented clearance. Without a prior decision on what we plan to do, your reassurances to Field about ready resolution founder.			
We must be ready because there is a Catch 22 in this area. These are joint programs and DoD and CIA will be bouncing HSC staff back and forth [redacted]			
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